Does contingent pay encourage positive employee attitudes and intensify work? by Ogbonnaya, Chidiebere et al.
1 
 
Does contingent pay encourage positive employee attitudes and intensify work? 
Abstract 
This paper explores the relationships between three dimensions of contingent pay – 
performance-related pay, profit-related pay and employee share-ownership – and positive 
employee attitudes (job satisfaction, employee commitment, and trust in management). The 
paper also examines a conflicting argument that contingent pay may intensify work and this 
can detract from its positive impact on employee attitudes. Of the three contingent pay 
dimensions, only performance-related pay had direct positive relationships with all three 
employee attitudes. Profit-related pay and employee share-ownership had a mix of negative 
and no significant direct relationships with employee attitudes, but profit-related pay showed 
U-shaped curvilinear relationships with all three employee attitudes. The results also 
indicated that performance-related pay is associated with work intensification, and this offsets 
some of its positive impact on employee attitudes.  
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Introduction 
Contingent pay, variously called incentive pay (Green and Heywood, 2008) and 
variable pay (Curran and Walsworth, 2014), has become increasingly important for 
motivating employees to perform productively at work (Pendleton et al., 2009). It represents 
one of key elements of Human Resource Management (HRM) systems aimed at achieving 
sustainable competitive success for an organization (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Gould-
Williams, 2003). Various types of contingent pay, including performance-related pay, profit-
related pay, and employee share-ownership, are identified as strategic tools for shaping 
positive employee attitudes such as job satisfaction (Heywood and Wei, 2006), organizational 
commitment (Bayo-Moriones and Larraza-Kintana, 2009) and trust in management (Coyle-
Shapiro et al., 2002). These pay arrangements provide important incentives that reinforce 
employees’ willingness to put forth discretionary effort, leading to higher levels of 
achievement and meaningful work-related goals.  
Despite reports to suggest a positive relationship between contingent pay and 
employee attitudes, there are indications that different contingent pay arrangements may 
intensify work (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990; Gallie et al., 1998; Green, 2004). Weitzman and 
Kruse (1990: p, 98), for example, noted the use of profit-sharing arrangements may prompt 
employees to expend greater work effort due to increased pressure to adopt modes of 
behaviours that enhance labour output. Under such circumstances, employees are induced to 
work too hard and too much, leading to work-related stress or poor well-being. To date, little 
progress has been made in gathering empirical evidence on whether contingent pay is in fact 
associated with the perception that work is more intense, and how this might impact on 
employees’ workplace attitudes. The current study presents a unique opportunity to advance 
our knowledge of how employees under different contingent pay arrangements are induced to 
work too hard and too much in response to high job demands.  
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The contribution of our study is to provide important insights into the relationships 
between three forms of contingent pay (performance-related pay, profit-related pay, and 
employee share-ownership) and employees’ job satisfaction, commitment, and trust in 
management. Our set of employee attitudes represents key determinants of the quality of 
employees’ functioning at work, which is crucial for understanding the productivity gains of 
contingent pay (Caramelli and Briole, 2007). Unlike individual-based contingent pay (e.g., 
performance-related pay), the attitudinal effects of organization-wide pay schemes may 
depend on coverage and accessibility. For example, employees under profit-related pay and 
employee share-ownership arrangements are more likely to respond positively if they are 
eligible to participate and profits are fairly distributed across organizational levels (Coyle-
Shapiro et al., 2002). Surprisingly, this important characteristic of organization-wide 
incentives has received scant attention in previous research. We fill this gap by examining U-
shaped curvilinear effects for profit-related pay and employee share-ownership on employee 
attitudes. We also add to the literature by examining the extent to which all three forms of 
contingent pay are associated with employees’ experience of work intensification, and the 
role of work intensification in explaining any unfavourable association between contingent 
pay and employee attitudes. Our study sets out to determine whether high work 
intensification arising from the use of particular types of contingent pay may offset any 
positive impact on employee attitudes.  
Contingent pay, theory and previous evidence 
Contingent pay represents workplace arrangements where some or all of employees’ 
remuneration are dependent on some measure of performance (Pendleton et al., 2009). 
Contingent pay may be determined by individual employees’ performance in relation to their 
level of contribution to organizational performance (individual-based incentive), or profit 
gained by the organization in which the employee works (organization-wide incentive). The 
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present study focuses on performance-related pay (an individual-based incentive), profit-
related pay and employee share-ownership (both organization-wide incentives). This set of 
contingent pay is by no means exhaustive, but it gives an indication of financial incentives 
central to debates around HRM systems and their impact on organizational performance 
(Appelbaum et al., 2000; Macky and Boxall, 2008). Moreover, this set of pay programs 
illustrates the kinds of contingent pay that organizations tend to use concurrently. For such 
organizations, a combination of individual-based and organization-wide incentive programs 
serves to maximize the benefits associated with each program and minimize the potential 
weaknesses (Kuvaas, 2006). 
Performance-related pay is an individual-based incentive offered by an assessment of 
individual employees’ work effort in relation to their contribution to organizational goals 
(Pendleton et al., 2009). Profit-related pay is an organization-wide incentive concerned with 
earnings accruable from a measure of organizational profitability. Employee share-ownership 
is an organization-wide incentive through which employers offer their shares at reduced rates 
to employees. It is often grouped together with profit-related pay under the generic heading 
of ‘financial participation schemes’ (Pendleton et al., 2009), but may differ in terms of 
eligibility and distribution of profit (Bryson et al., 2012). We operationalize all three 
dimensions of contingent pay at the organizational level using management data on how each 
payment system is applied in the workplace. This allows us to examine the extent to which 
contingent pay, measured at the workplace level, might be associated with work-related 
attitudes at the level of individual employees. A cross-level investigation such as this is 
uncommon in HRM research, but relevant for a more pragmatic understanding of the micro 
and macro effects of an important HRM strategy.  
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Contingent pay and employee attitudes 
 
Different types of contingent pay operate by different underlying assumptions, and for 
a number of reasons (e.g., pay determination criteria), may influence employee attitudes 
differently. Nevertheless, their fundamental purpose is the same, and that is to motivate 
employees to higher levels of goal attainment (Pendleton et al., 2009). This similarity across 
all contingent pay systems may override any differences in their attitudinal effects. The 
present study seeks to examine the extent to which different contingent pay systems converge 
in terms of their attitudinal effects, and thus, ascertain whether any differences in their use are 
important for employee attitudes. However, if no evidence is found to suggest that results 
across contingent pay systems converge, we can infer that their dissimilarities are relevant to 
employee outcomes.  
The motivation-driven process associated with contingent pay is often explained by 
expectancy theories of motivation (Bayo-Moriones and Larraza-Kintana, 2009; Coyle-
Shapiro et al., 2002). Accordingly, employees tend to make rational connections between 
their expended effort, level of performance, and rewards received. If contingent pay is 
perceived as a valuable reward that satisfies an important need, and employees’ level of 
performance is essential for attaining that reward, employees may adopt behaviours that 
enhance their work effort in anticipation that their effort will improve performance and lead 
to that reward. In other words, the desirability of financial rewards attainable through 
contingent pay may have a major bearing on employee motivation to perform well and 
subsequently their positive workplace attitudes (Kuvaas, 2006). 
In line with expectancy theories of motivation, studies examining the attitudinal 
effects of performance-related pay report a positive relationship with employees’ job 
satisfaction and commitment. Heywood and Wei (2006), for example, reported a positive 
relationship between performance-related pay and job satisfaction among youths in the 
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United States. According to Heywood and Wei, the use of performance-related pay enhances 
employees’ job satisfaction and optimizes employees’ work efficiency in ways that earnings 
from periodic salaries or hourly wages do not. Because performance-related pay is offered to 
boost employees’ motivation and reward them for good job performance, it stimulates 
employees’ perceptions that their work effort is being appreciated, and this can lead to greater 
job satisfaction (Green and Heywood, 2008) and organisational commitment (Curran and 
Walsworth, 2014). 
Studies have also reported positive links between profit-related pay and job 
satisfaction (Kruse, 1996; Bauer, 2004; Heywood and Wei, 2006). Bauer (2004) in his study 
of European Union member states showed positive links between an incentive-index measure 
(comprising profit-sharing schemes and income received from workplace bonuses) and job 
satisfaction. Profit-related pay schemes are well-received by employees because they increase 
employees’ financial stake in the organization. Such schemes may also strengthen 
employees’ sense organizational identification and align employees’ interests more closely 
with organizational goals (Bayo-Moriones and Larraza-Kintana, 2009). This in turn may 
reinforce employees’ job satisfaction, due to an increased sense of job security (Curran and 
Walsworth, 2014), and enhance employees’ long-term commitment to the organization 
(Caramelli and Briole, 2007). 
Employee share-ownership may also have positive attitudinal effects because it 
fosters employees’ financial stake in the organization and aligns their interests more closely 
with organizational values (Kruse, 1996; Caramelli and Briole, 2007; Kruse et al., 2012). A 
seminal study on employee share-ownership is Klein (1987) who identified three pathways to 
positive employee attitudes. Accordingly, employee share-ownership promotes employees’ 
commitment to and satisfaction with the organization by increasing employees’ sense of 
organizational identification (intrinsic satisfaction model), by increasing employees’ 
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influence in workplace decisions (instrumental satisfaction model), and by being financially 
rewarding for employees (extrinsic satisfaction model). Employees in share-ownership plans 
tend to identify better with the organization, may have higher ‘say’ in workplace decisions 
and earn comparably higher wages than their counterparts (Caramelli and Briole, 2007).  
Various forms of contingent pay elicit greater levels of employee commitment and 
trust in management by communicating signals about the extent to which employees’ job 
performance is appreciated by management (Kruse et al., 2010). This assumption is 
consistent with the ‘norm of reciprocity’, the expectation that employees will respond 
positively to favourable treatment received from their employer (Gould-Williams, 2003). 
When an employer offers something (such as extra pay) which employees consider to be 
valuable and reasonably fair, employees develop positive perceptions about the extent to 
which the employer cares for their well-being. Employees might consequently feel indebted 
to the employer and reciprocate through greater levels of trust and commitment (Whitener, 
2001; Gould-Williams, 2003). Similarly, contingent pay may be likened to a type of ‘gift’ 
exchange obliging employees to reciprocate through greater commitment and loyalty towards 
the organization (Bryson and Freeman, 2012). It may enhance employees’ trust that 
management will recognize and deliver on its financial obligations towards the workforce, 
leading to mutual benefits for employees, through earnings, and the employer, through a 
more committed and dedicated workforce. Our first hypothesis is based on an expectation 
that all three dimensions of contingent pay are positively associated with employee attitudes. 
Hypothesis 1: (a) Performance-related pay, (b) profit-related pay, and (c) employee 
share-ownership are positively related to employees’ job satisfaction, commitment 
and trust in management, respectively.  
Unlike individual-based incentives, organization-wide incentives may be influenced 
by ‘coverage’ and ‘eligibility’ for participation (Florkowski, 1987). ‘Coverage’ refers to the 
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extent to which organization-wide incentives are accessible across organizational levels, 
whereas ‘eligibility’ concerns the extent to which individual employees are allowed to benefit 
from involvement in organization-wide incentive plans. It is suggested that poor coverage 
and eligibility may induce perceptions of inequity, such that employees may develop negative 
feelings about intended outcomes of organization-wide incentives if they are not allowed to 
participate (Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002; Florkowski, 1987). This assumption aligns with the 
principle of distributive injustice, which connects perceived unfairness with the allocation or 
distribution of organizational resources (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). For example, if 
there is perceived inequality in the manner in which organizational resources are distributed 
among organizational members, feelings of being mistreated may ensue, leading to job 
dissatisfaction, poor organizational commitment and distrust (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 
2001). One might thus expect organization-wide incentives such as profit-related pay and 
employee share-ownership to have negative attitudinal effects if such arrangements are 
accessible only to a few employees. 
The reverse may, however, apply where profit-related pay and employee share-
ownership are accessible by many employees, regardless of their employment status. 
Employees may develop positive opinions about such schemes and respond through positive 
work-related attitudes. Thus, we expect U-shaped curvilinear relationships for profit-related 
pay and employee share-ownership with employees’ job satisfaction, commitment, and trust 
in management, respectively. First, a downward sloping (or negative) relationship with 
employee attitudes may occur to demonstrate that low, but non-zero, coverage of profit-
related pay and employee share-ownership at the workplace has detrimental effects relative to 
no coverage of these pay schemes. However, the upward sloping portion of the U-shaped 
curve would suggest that profit-related pay and employee share-ownership have positive 
relationships with employee attitudes in organizations where they are accessible and spread 
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across a wide distribution of the workplace, relative to organizations where employees have 
more restricted access.  
Hypothesis 2: (a) Profit-related pay, and (b) employee share-ownership have U-
shaped curvilinear relationships with employees’ job satisfaction, commitment and 
trust in management, respectively.  
Contingent pay and work intensification 
As with some HRM strategies, the use of contingent pay has been associated with 
perceptions of work intensification (Gallie et al., 1998; Green, 2004). Work intensification is 
defined as a measure of the amount of work effort expended in relation to one’s experience of 
high work demands and pressure (White et al., 2003). It is considered among the main 
consequences of adopting systems of HRM practices; particularly where such systems are 
implemented with greater emphasis on labour productivity (Ogbonnaya and Valizade, 2015). 
The relationship between HRM practices and work intensification draws on the critical 
perspective of HRM, according to which HRM systems are perceived as exploitative, or a 
management tool designed to control employees in order to drive organizational performance 
(Ogbonnaya and Valizade, 2015). This perspective follows a tradition of research in the 
labour process critique, where management practices aimed at maximizing labour input are 
thought to elicit greater work effort from employees at the expense of employee well-being.  
Although individual-based incentives such as performance-related pay can motivate 
employees to be more productive, they might also increase employees’ experience of work 
intensification (Green, 2004; Green and Heywood, 2008). Green (2004: p, 718) identified 
performance-related pay as a type of financial investment that many employers use to elicit 
greater work effort from willing employees to promote organizational performance. By tying 
employees’ performance to financial incentives, employers send signals to employees about 
their intention to reward extra work effort with more pay. Employees in turn receive these 
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signals and feel obliged to work harder in exchange for more pay. Even though employees 
may value these earnings as a ‘good thing’, the ultimate beneficiary of their extra effort is the 
organization. As a consequence, performance-related pay may be considered exploitative, or 
a management strategy that increases both earnings and work intensification (Green and 
Heywood, 2008). 
Previous studies have not offered much guidance as to how organizational-wide 
incentives (profit-related pay and employee share-ownership) may increase work 
intensification. Nevertheless, exogenous factors (e.g., economic uncertainties and a large 
number of people with financial stakes in the organization) associated with organization-wide 
incentives may drive employees into behaviours that increase work intensification (Kruse, 
1996; Kruse et al., 2012). Some of these behaviours include competing among colleagues for 
higher pay, or monitoring each other to sanction colleagues who do or do not deserve to 
receive extra pay. Moreover, profit-related pay and employee share-ownership may increase 
work intensification due to greater work responsibilities associated with participation in such 
schemes (Green and Heywood, 2008; Kruse et al., 2010). This assumption rests on the 
premise that employees in organizational-wide incentive schemes are more likely involved in 
workplace decision-making activities, usually without adjustments to their other routine job 
tasks (Kruse et al., 2010). This type of involvement could create a scenario where employees 
derive pay increases, but remain susceptible to work overloads, long working hours and 
work-related pressure (Green and Heywood, 2008). We therefore expect a positive 
relationship between contingent pay and work intensification. 
Hypothesis 3: (a) Performance-related pay, (b) profit-related pay, and (c) employee 
share-ownership are positively related to employees’ experience of work 
intensification. 
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Contingent pay, work intensification and poor employee attitudes. 
To better understand how work intensification may reduce any positive impact of 
HRM practices on employee attitudes and well-being, Wood et al. (2012) stipulated a 
potential theory – the counteracting effects model. Accordingly, HRM practices that motivate 
employees and encourage greater productivity do not only improve organizational 
performance, but also experiences of work-related stress and pressure. The perception of 
work-related stress and pressure may in turn offset the positive impact of HRM practices on 
employee attitudes and well-being. The counteracting effects model is therefore consistent 
with the idea that greater work demands and pressure may expose employees to job 
dissatisfaction (Macky and Boxall, 2008), poor organizational commitment (Whitener, 2001), 
and feelings of distrust towards management (Appelbaum et al., 2000). If we assume that 
contingent pay is adopted primarily to promote employees’ work efficiency and the processes 
associated with it can increase work intensification (Green and Heywood, 2008), then we 
might expect higher work intensification to cancel out any positive relationship between 
contingent pay and employee attitudes. For the fourth hypothesis, we test the conflicting 
assumption that work intensification mediates a negative relationship between contingent pay 
and employee attitudes. 
Hypothesis 4: Work intensification mediates a negative relationship between (a) 
performance-related pay, (b) profit-related pay, and (c) employee share-ownership 
and job satisfaction, employee commitment and trust in management, respectively. 
Sample  
The present study used data from the management and employee surveys of the 2011 
Workplace Employment Relations Study (2011 WERS). The 2011 WERS is the sixth in a 
series of surveys first conducted in 1980. The study is representative of around 35% of all 
British workplaces including those in the private and public sectors, most industries 
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(exceptions are agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying), and firms 
consisting of at least five employees. Organizational-level data were gathered through an 
interview with the most senior manager with responsibility for employment relations, human 
resources or personnel management. A total of 2,680 face-to-face structured interviews with 
managers were undertaken, each of which lasted about 90 minutes. Employee-level data were 
collected through a self-completion questionnaire distributed to all employees in workplaces 
with fewer than 25 employees, and to a random sample of 25 employees in larger workplaces 
with more than 25 employees. A total of 21,981 employees completed the survey.  
To accommodate the nested structure of the 2011 WERS, organizational-level data 
were reduced from 2,680 cases to 1,923 such that only responses from workplaces who 
participated in the employee survey were included. A further decision was made to exclude 
public sector workplaces (i.e., workplaces whose formal status may be described as 
government-owned limited company, public service agency, central government authorities 
and so on). This decision was made because (i) public sector organizations are more 
constrained in terms of using contingent pay arrangements, and (ii) private sector workplaces 
in Britain are more likely than public sector workplaces to adopt the kinds of pay schemes 
considered in the present study (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). Our final sample comprises 
13,657 employees nested within 1,293 workplaces. 
Employee attitudes and work intensification  
Measures of job satisfaction, employee commitment, employee trust in management, 
and work intensification were derived by employees’ self-reports from the 2011 WERS 
employee survey. Internal consistency between measurement items was verified by reliability 
statistics (Cronbach’s alpha with standardized estimates to account for differing metrics), 
while construct validity was verified by Composite Reliability (CR) and Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE). Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) confirmed the underlying factorial 
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structure of these measures, ensuring adequate fit between the constructs and observed data. 
Full details of all employee-level variables, corresponding items, and descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 1.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Job satisfaction was derived by four items measuring the level of contentment and 
pleasure derived from various aspects of work. The five-point response scale for these items 
ranged from ‘very dissatisfied’ to ‘very satisfied’. Organizational Commitment was derived 
by three items to capture employees’ level of attachment and identification with the 
organization. The five-point response scale for these items ranged from ‘strongly disagree’ to 
‘strongly agree’. Employee trust in management was derived by three items measured on a 
five-point Likert scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. Work intensification was 
derived by two five-point Likert scale items ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’. All scales were coded such that high values reflected high scores on the construct. 
Cronbach’s alpha for work intensification is lower than the conventional 0.70 threshold, but 
our latent variable approach and use of maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard 
errors adjusts for measurement unreliability. 
Contingent pay 
Measurement items for contingent pay were selected from the 2011 WERS 
management survey following the precedents in previous studies (e.g., Green, 2004; Bayo-
Moriones and Larraza-Kintana, 2009; Park and Kruse, 2014). Performance-related pay was 
measured by two items: ‘do any employees in the workplace get paid by merit and results’ 
and ‘what proportion of staff is paid by merit and results’. Profit-related pay was also 
measured by two items: ‘do any employees receive profit-related pay or bonuses’ and ‘what 
proportion of staff received profit-related pay in the past 12 months’. The first set of items for 
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both variables is binary (‘Yes/No’ questions), whereas the second set has six response 
categories: ‘all’ (100%) employees, ‘almost all’ (80-99%) employees, ‘most’ (60-79%) 
employees, ‘around half’ (40-59%) employees, ‘some’ (20-39%) employees and ‘just a few’ 
(1-19%) employees. These were recoded as binary items equal to 1 if ‘around half’ (i.e., 40% 
to 100%) of employees are covered. Employee share-ownership was measured by two items. 
The first item concerns the types of employee share-ownership schemes operated in the 
workplace (recoded as a binary item equal to 1 if ‘at least one type of ownership scheme is 
operated’) and the second item concerns the proportion of employees eligible for such 
schemes (recoded as a binary item equal to 1 if ‘around half’ of employees are eligible). 
Details of the contingent pay variables and corresponding items are presented in Table 1. 
As all contingent pay items are binary, latent trait analysis was used to access their 
factorial structure to ensure discriminant validity (Heinen, 1996). A three-factor latent trait 
model confirmed the hypothesized dimensionality of all three separate contingent pay 
dimensions. Model fit was adequate: Chi-Square (X
2
) = 93.80; degrees of freedom (df) = 6; p-
value < 0.001; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.04; Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) = 0.99; Tucker–Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.99. A single-factor latent trait model of 
all contingent pay items failed to fit the data (X
2
 = 7323.601; df = 9; p-value < 0.001; 
RMSEA = 0.25; CFI = 0.66; TLI = 0.43).  
Control variables  
We controlled for five variables: workplace size (number of employees currently on 
the payroll at the workplace), tenure (the number of years the employee has been working at 
the workplace), contract type (employment based on permanent, temporary or fixed period 
contract), gender and age. These control variables were selected in line with previous studies 
(e.g., Heywood and Wei, 2006; Pendleton et al., 2009; Kruse et al., 2010).  
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Data analysis 
Hypothesized relationships were examined by structural equation modelling with 
latent variables, performed on the basis of multilevel analysis. Multilevel analysis was used 
to account for the nested structure of our data (i.e., contingent pay measured at the 
organizational level and employee attitudes and work intensification measured at the 
employee level). Two sets of structural equation models were estimated with the robust 
maximum likelihood estimator (MLR) and the numerical integration algorithm in the Mplus 
software program (version 7.1 that enables estimation of curvilinear effects with latent 
variables). The MLR estimator and numerical integration algorithm are suitable for multilevel 
analysis, adjusts for errors in measures, and accounts for non-normality in the data 
(Asparouhov and Muthen, 2008).  
The first model (Model 1) corresponds to Hypotheses 1 to 3 (see Figure 1) and 
comprised three main components: (i) the measurement models for all three dimensions of 
contingent pay, all three employee attitudes and work intensification; (ii) a command to 
specify quadratic terms (i.e., the variable multiplied by itself) for profit-related pay and 
employee share-ownership; and (iii) a structural model for which the latent factors of all three 
employee attitudes and work intensification were regressed on the latent factors of all three 
contingent pay schemes, the two quadratic terms and control variables. The quadratic terms 
were used to test the curvilinear effects of profit-related pay and employee share-ownership 
on employee attitudes (i.e., Hypotheses 2). 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
The second model (Model 2) corresponds to Hypotheses 4 (see Figure 2) and 
comprised four components: (i) the measurement models for all three contingent pay 
schemes, all three employee attitudes and work intensification; (ii) a structural model for 
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which the latent factor of work intensification was regressed on the latent factors of all three 
contingent pay schemes and the two quadratic terms; (iii) another structural model for which 
the latent factors of all three employee attitudes were regressed on the latent factor of work 
intensification, the latent factors of all three contingent pay schemes, the two quadratic terms 
and control variables; and (iv) a syntax for all mediated effects through work intensification. 
Statistical significance for mediated effects was validated by the distribution of the product of 
coefficients method (MacKinnon et al., 2002). This technique is appropriate for multilevel 
analysis and avoids problems associated with the more widely known Sobel’s test 
(MacKinnon et al., 2002). 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Results  
Standard model fit statistics such as RMSEA, CFI and TLI are not available for 
Models 1 and 2 due to use of numerical integration algorithm. We therefore estimated a 
reference model with the same measurement and structural components but without the 
quadratic terms and the numerical integration algorithm. The reference model showed 
adequate model fit: Chi-square (X
2
) = 1712.43; df = 185; p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.03; 
CFI = 0.96; TLI = 0.94. Factor loadings are provided in Table 1. The patterns of factor 
loadings in the reference model were the same with Models 1 and 2. All items loaded on their 
factors in the direction hypothesized. 
The results of the first model are reported in Table 2. Performance-related pay was 
positively associated with job satisfaction (β = 0.04, p < 0.05), employees’ commitment (β = 
0.04, p < 0.05) and trust in management (β = 0.06, p < 0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is fully 
supported for performance-related pay. Profit-related pay was not significantly related to job 
satisfaction (β = -0.05, p > 0.05) and was negatively related to organizational commitment (β 
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= -0.05, p < 0.05) and trust in management (β = -0.08, p < 0.01). For employee share-
ownership, there was a negative relationship with job satisfaction (β = -0.08, p < 0.05) and 
no significant relationships with organizational commitment (β = -0.01, p > 0.05) and trust in 
management (β = 0.05, p > 0.05). Hypothesis 1 is not supported for profit-related pay and 
employee share-ownership. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
The quadratic term for profit-related pay showed positive relationships with job 
satisfaction (β = 0.09, p < 0.01), organizational commitment (β = 0.10, p < 0.001) and 
employee trust in management (β = 0.13, p < 0.001); thus, Hypothesis 2 is fully supported 
for profit-related pay. The form of these relationships indicates profit-related pay initially has 
a negative relationship with employee attitudes from zero to medium levels of profit-related 
pay, and a positive relationship with employee attitudes from medium to high levels of profit-
related pay (see plots in Figures 3, 4 and 5). The quadratic term for employee share-
ownership however showed no significant relationships with any employee attitude measures.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Performance-related pay was positively related with work intensification (β = 0.03, p 
< 0.01), whereas profit-related pay (β = -0.03, p > 0.05) and employee share-ownership (β = 
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-0.02, p > 0.05) were not significantly related with work intensification. Thus, Hypothesis 3 
is supported for performance-related pay only.  
The lower portion of Table 2 shows 95% confidence intervals derived from the 
distribution of the product of coefficients method. This method was used to validate mediated 
relationships (αβ) between contingent pay and employee attitudes via work intensification. 
Work intensification is negatively related with job satisfaction (β = -0.26, p < 0.001) and 
employees’ trust in management (β = -0.29, p < 0.001), but there is no significant 
relationship with organizational commitment. Through work intensification, performance-
related pay has negative indirect relationships with job satisfaction (αβ = -0.01, p < 0.05) and 
employee trust in management (αβ = -0.01, p < 0.05). Hypothesis 4 is therefore partially 
supported for performance-related pay (since the mediated path to organizational 
commitment is not significant). Profit-related pay and employee share-ownership had no 
significant indirect relationships, via work intensification, with any employee attitude 
measure. Thus, Hypotheses 4 is not supported for profit-related pay and employee share-
ownership. 
Discussion and implications of study 
The present study gives important insights into how different dimensions of 
contingent pay are associated with employees’ work-related attitudes. The study is arguably 
the first to show empirical support for claims that the productivity gains of compensation 
strategies might be associated with employees’ experience of work intensification. We found, 
within the limits of our analysis, that individual-based incentives may not always have 
positive effects on employee attitudes, and high work intensification might explain why. 
Our analysis showed performance-related pay, an individual-based incentive, has 
direct positive relationships with job satisfaction, employee commitment, and trust in 
management, respectively. This finding corroborates the mutual gains argument that HRM 
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strategies may enhance the performance of an organization through positive effects on 
employee outcomes. Job satisfaction, employee commitment, and trust in management are 
recognized in the mutual gains thesis as key ingredients for enhancing workplace 
performance due to their concomitance with improved employees’ productivity and work 
efficiency (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Whitener, 2001). We thus interpret the positive influence 
of performance-related pay on these employee attitudes as a type of mutuality in which 
employees receive pay rises in exchange for an increased sense of commitment towards 
developing a more effective organization. 
The practical implication of this finding is to identify earnings from performance-
related pay as a guaranteed source of income even in periods of economic uncertainty. We 
make this argument on the basis that data for the present study were collected during a period 
when many British workplaces were experiencing reductions in staff benefits and major cuts 
in wages due to economic recession (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). Such periods of economic 
uncertainty are often associated with reduced profitability for an organization; workers may 
find it difficult to earn extra pay (Kruse, 1996). However, because earnings from 
performance-related pay are directly proportional to individual employee’s level of 
performance rather than organizational profit, employees are confident about receiving extra 
pay whether or not the organization is adversely affected by economic uncertainties.  
Although we had hypothesized a direct positive relationship between profit-related 
pay and employee attitudes, our analysis showed no support for this. Profit-related pay was 
instead found to have no significant relationship with job satisfaction, and negative 
relationships with employee commitment and trust in management, respectively. These 
findings are generally unexpected in the light of previous research (see Kruse, 1996; 
Heywood and Wei, 2006; Park and Kruse, 2014). Another surprising finding was that 
employee share-ownership had a direct negative relationship with job satisfaction, and no 
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significant relationships with employee commitment and trust in management, respectively. 
Again, these results contradict previous studies (e.g., Kruse et al., 2010; Bryson and Freeman, 
2012) where share-ownership schemes have been linked with positive employee outcomes. It 
is suggested that organization-wide incentives allow employees to partake in the distribution 
of organizational wealth thereby improving employees’ work-related attitudes.  
One factor that may explain the relationship between profit-related pay and employee 
attitudes is the extent to which such schemes are accessible and spread across organizational 
levels. Our analysis revealed U-shaped curvilinear interactions between profit-related pay and 
all three measures of employee attitudes. As illustrated in Figures 3 to 5, profit-related pay 
initially had downward sloping relationships with job satisfaction, employee commitment and 
trust in management, but higher levels of profit-related pay were associated with positive 
employee outcomes. That means at higher levels of employees’ uptake or participation, 
profit-related pay had a positive rather than a negative impact on employee attitudes. This 
assumption is informed by the links between distributive justice (i.e., the perceived degree of 
fairness in allocating or distributing organizational resources) and employee attitudes. 
Employees are more likely to cede their personal interests in favour of organizational 
objectives if workplace resources are distributed fairly across organizational levels (Cohen-
Charash and Spector, 2001). Thus, if profit-related pay is concentrated in a small proportion 
of the workplace, employees may feel maltreated and display poor work-related attitudes. 
However, if profit-related pay is spread across a wide distribution of the workplace, 
employees may show greater acceptance and reciprocate by positive workplace attitudes. 
The practical implication of this is the need to encourage fairness and adequate 
employee uptake of profit-sharing arrangements. Employers should ensure that mechanisms 
for distributing organizational profits are administered efficiently so as not to miss providing 
salient rewards to deserving employees in a timely manner (Green and Heywood, 2008). 
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Where compensation strategies are perceived to be equitable, employees are more likely to 
show greater acceptance of such arrangements, and demonstrate better work-related attitudes 
(Kruse et al., 2012). Moreover, a well-managed profit-sharing scheme may serve as a type of 
‘gift’ exchange that engenders mutual gains between employers and employees (Bryson and 
Freeman, 2012). By partaking in the distribution of organizational profit, employees accept a 
‘gift’ from the employer, and based on the norm of reciprocity, might return the ‘favour’ 
through positive work-related attitudes (Kruse et al., 2010). 
Turning now to employee share-ownership, our analysis showed no significant 
curvilinear interaction with any employee attitude measure. Does this imply, therefore, that 
perceived unfairness in employees’ access to organizational-wide incentives might explain 
the attitudinal effects of some schemes (e.g., profit-related pay) but not others (e.g., employee 
share-ownership)? Alternatively, do we conclude based on Klein’s (1987) argument that 
employee share-ownership may sometimes fail to elicit positive employee attitudes because it 
does not provide prompt rewards for individual work effort? Although the literature has not 
given much insight into how employee share-ownership may impact negatively on employee 
attitudes, we draw on the assumption that share ownership plans are susceptible to stock price 
fluctuations, and this may have an effect on participating employees (Klein, 1987). 
Fluctuations in stock prices tend to follow a downward trend during periods of economic 
crises, such as was the case when data for the present study was collected (Van Wanrooy et 
al., 2013). Organizations in such circumstances are constrained in terms of their contributions 
to employee share-ownership, which may have unfavourable consequences for employee 
attitudes. Altogether, the divergence in results across all three contingent pay systems 
indicates that their dissimilarities outweigh their commonalities. There is therefore a need for 
further research to examine why contingent pay systems may have dissimilarities in 
outcomes. 
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Contingent pay, work intensification, and employee attitudes 
Of the three dimensions of contingent pay, only performance-related pay is associated 
with the feeling that work might be too demanding or that one has insufficient time to get 
work done. This finding corroborates reports that performance-related pay is associated with 
high job demands and pressure (Gallie et al., 1998; White et al., 2003; Green, 2004). For 
example, Green (2004), in a study of British establishments, showed enacting performance-
related pay as part of an overall high-commitment work regime may lead to employees’ 
experience of high work demands. Green used the broad concept of ‘effort incentives’, a term 
which also incorporates performance-related pay, to illustrate a reward mechanism by which 
employers entice willing employees to expend higher work effort in exchange for more pay. 
Performance-related pay may be perceived as an exploitative payment system, or a burden of 
responsibility that provides extra pay for workers, but ultimately benefits the employer.  
A related concern for performance-related pay is that the feeling of work 
intensification associated with it may detract from its positive impact on job satisfaction, 
employee commitment and trust in management, respectively. This finding aligns with Wood 
et al.’s (2012) counteracting effects model. As with other HRM strategies, performance-
related pay might be counterproductive for employees due to its positive association with 
work intensification. In particular, performance-related pay might derail employee attitudes 
where employees perceive that the mechanisms for evaluating their performance (e.g., 
performance appraisals) are overly subjective or implemented unjustly (Heywood and Wei, 
2006; Green and Heywood, 2008). In such circumstances, performance-related pay might 
miss providing salient rewards to deserving employees despite subjecting them to high work 
demands and pressure (Whitener, 2001). This in turn may promote feelings of not being 
adequately appreciated, leading to poor workplace attitudes. 
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The implication of our result for human resource practitioners is that Wood et al.’s 
(2012) counteracting effects model may be applicable to individual-based incentives but not 
organization-wide incentives. Our analysis questions the extent to which an individual-based 
incentive such as performance-related pay may promote positive employee attitudes in a 
sustainable way, particularly if one considers the potential impact of work intensification. 
Thus, the nature of the relationships between performance-related pay and employee attitudes 
may depend on a perceived imbalance between intensive work effort and the availability of 
commensurate rewards. If employees perceive a lack of reciprocity between the work efforts 
expended in relation to the measure of rewards received, feelings of distrust may ensue and 
lead to poor employer-employee relations (Siegrist et al., 2004). 
Limitation and strengths of study 
The main limitation of the present study is that its cross-sectional nature has 
precluded us from making strong causal statements. However, considering our predictions are 
grounded in existing theories of motivation, we believe our findings are robust to allow 
comparison with evidence from previous studies. Another limitation of the present study 
concerns the relatively small effect size for contingent pay. This issue is not unusual in HRM 
research, and especially, studies based on the British WERS (e.g., Wood et al., 2012). Data 
for the present study, the 2011 WERS, were collected at a population level to maximize 
representativeness for the British workforce. A small effect in the WERS context should have 
practical importance when applied to the British economy as a whole. 
The key strengths of our study relate to its large sample size and multilevel design. 
The large sample size enabled a more reliable analysis of our study population, whereas our 
multilevel design allowed us to partition measurement errors into organizational- and 
employee-level components. Both features helped in achieving meaningful estimates for our 
hypothesized relationships. The present study is novel in that it simultaneously assesses the 
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direct and indirect relationships between different dimensions of contingent pay and 
measures of employees’ own experience of work. The study demonstrates how individual-
based and organizational-wide incentive schemes may vary in terms of their influences on 
positive employee attitudes. Further studies might take a lead from our analysis to examine 
the attitudinal effects of contingent pay in particular organizational settings such as financial 
services, sales and retail. The HRM literature, and indeed practitioners, would benefit from 
empirical evidence on whether different contingent pay dimensions converge in terms of their 
impact on employee attitudes in specific contexts and work environments. 
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TABLE 1 Variables and descriptive statistics 
Variables Observed Items Mean SD 
Factor 
loadings 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Composite 
Reliability 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
Performance-
related pay 
Do any employees in this workplace receive pay by 
results or merit  
0.50 0.50 0.76 
- - - 
What proportion of staff get paid by results or merit  0.33 0.47 0.93 
Profit-related 
pay 
Do any employees receive profit-related pay or bonuses 0.39 0.49 0.77 
- - - What proportion of staff received profit-related pay in the 
past 12 months 
0.17 0.38 0.74 
Employee 
share-
ownership  
Does this company operate any employee  share-
ownership schemes 
0.23 0.42 0.97 
- - - 
What proportion of staff are eligible for share-ownership  0.19 0.39 0.90 
Job 
satisfaction 
How satisfied are you with the opportunity to develop your 
skills 
3.43 1.08 0.72 
0.73 0.73 0.41 
How satisfied are you with the amount of pay you  receive 3.04 1.13 0.55 
How satisfied are you with your job security 3.55 1.01 0.60 
How satisfied are you with the work itself 3.88 0.87 0.68 
Organizational 
Commitment 
I share many of the values of my organization 3.73 0.86 0.73 
0.86 0.86 0.67 I feel loyal to my organization 3.94 0.90 0.86 
I am proud to tell people who I work for 3.87 0.97 0.87 
Employees’ 
trust 
Managers here can be relied upon to keep to their promises 3.35 1.06 0.87 
0.92 0.87 0.80 
Managers here are sincere in attempting to understand 
employees' views 
3.45 1.07 0.91 
Managers here deal with employees honestly 3.50 1.04 0.90 
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Work 
intensification 
My job requires that I work very hard 4.10 0.78 0.58 
0.52 0.55 0.40 
I never seem to have enough time to get my work done 3.18 1.07 0.65 
Control variables 
Workplace 
size 
Number of employees currently on the payroll at this workplace    
Tenure How many years in total have you been working at this workplace    
Contract type Which of the phrases below best describes your job here       
Gender Male or female       
Age Age       
Sample size = 13657 employees nested within 1293 workplaces 
Note: All factor loadings are standardized scores and significant at p < 0.001 
SD = Standard Deviation 
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TABLE 2 Results for Models 1 and 2  
Direct effects of contingent pay on employee attitudes and work intensification 
Variables 
Job 
Satisfaction 
(residuals) 
Employee 
Commitment 
(residuals) 
Employee 
Trust 
(residuals) 
Work 
Intensification 
(residuals) 
Performance-related pay 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
 (0.02) 
0.06**  
(0.02) 
0.03**  
(0.01) 
Profit-related pay 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.05* 
 (0.03) 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
-0.03  
(0.02) 
Profit-related pay Quadratic 
term 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Employee share-ownership 
(ESOP) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.01  
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
ESOP Quadratic term   
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Workplace size 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
Tenure 
-0.05***  
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.13*** 
(0.01) 
0.04***  
(0.01) 
Contract type 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04***  
(0.01) 
Gender 
0.06***  
(0.01) 
0.08***  
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
Age 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
95% Confidence intervals (from distribution of the product of coefficients method) for indirect effects 
 
Job  
Satisfaction 
Employee 
Commitment 
Employee 
Trust 
Contingent pay 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Performance-related pay -0.014 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.015 -0.001 
Profit-related pay -0.004 0.020 -0.001 0.003 -0.005 0.021 
Profit-related pay Quadratic term -0.016 0.008 -0.003 0.001 -0.017 0.009 
Employee share-ownership (ESOP) -0.009 0.022 -0.001 0.004 -0.010 0.024 
ESOP Quadratic term   -0.019 0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.020 0.007 
All regression coefficients and residuals are standardized scores 
Significance levels: *** = p < .001, **  = p < .01, * = p < .05 
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